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The federal minimum wage was established in 1938 by the Fair Labor Standards Act. Initially
set at 25 cents per hour, the minimum wage has been raised periodically to re￿ ect changes in
in￿ ation and productivity. On May 24, 2007, Congress approved the ￿rst increase in the federal
minimum wage since September 1, 1997.
For the 10 years in between, the minimum wage stayed at $5.15 an hour, but its real value
declined steadily from about 40 percent of the average private nonsupervisory wage to a mere
30 percent. Adjusted for in￿ ation, the minimum wage was lower at the beginning of 2007 than
at any time since 1955 (see ￿gure 1). Moreover, the fraction of hourly workers who earned no
more than the minimum wage dropped from around 15 percent in 1980 to just 2.2 percent in
2006. By the beginning of 2007, the federal minimum was binding in only 21 states. On May
24, Congress passed a bill raising the historically low real federal minimum wage to $7.25 in





























* If minimum wage changed during the course of a year, value reflects weighted average for the year.
** Through May 2006.
Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
Percent
Portion of hourly paid workers
at or below minimum wage
Projected level
through 2009
Figure 1: Federal Minimum Wage and Portion of Workers at or Below Minimum
Wage
When it was established in 1938, Fair Labor Standards Act emphasized using minimum
wage policy to reduce poverty. In this Policy Discussion Paper, we want to clarify the debate
2about the minimum wage by analyzing how the main economic theories view its e⁄ects on the
labor market. Broadly speaking, opponents of a minimum wage believe that labor markets are
competitive and any wage regulation is therefore bound to reduce employment, especially among
low-skilled workers. On the other hand, the wage￿ s proponents believe that labor markets are
dominated by some employers, and argue that a minimum wage can exert positive e⁄ects on
labor market outcomes by reducing employers￿excessive market power. Unfortunately, both
descriptions are extremely stylized. In this Policy Discussion Paper, we study alternative and
more realistic environments and we investigate whether they deliver similar conclusions about
the e⁄ects of minimum wage. We focus on labor markets featuring search frictions in various
di⁄erent forms as in Pissarides (2000). Our analysis consists of examples with endogenous search
e⁄ort, labor force participation decision, a decision about hours of work, and endogenous job
destruction due to heterogeneity in match productivity. We also calibrate our model economies
to match some key U.S. labor market moments and then present the e⁄ects of minimum wage
through numerical examples.
2 Search E⁄ort
We start with a simple version of the labor market search model with endogenous search inten-
sity.
2.1 Environment
The environment is similar to chapter 5 in Pissarides (2000). Time is discrete. Agents are risk-
neutral and discount future utility according to the factor ￿ 2 (0;1). There is a unit-measure
of workers indexed by i in [0;1] and a large measure of ￿rms which are free to enter the market.
Each worker is endowed with one unit of labor and each ￿rm corresponds to a single job. A
match composed of one job and one worker produces z units of output per period. The wage
paid by a ￿rm to its worker is w ￿ z.
When unemployed a worker receives an income b ￿ w that can be interpreted as unemploy-
ment bene￿ts, or the utility that the worker derives from not working. An unemployed worker
must also expand some e⁄ort, denoted s, to ￿nd a job. The disutility associated with this
3search e⁄ort (or intensity) is c(s) where c0(:) > 0, c00(:) > 0, c(0) = c0(0) = 0 and c0(1) = 1.
Similarly, a ￿rm with a vacant job must incur a cost ￿ > 0 to advertise its vacancy.
The labor market is subject to search-matching frictions captured by an aggregate matching







where U ￿ [0;1] is the set of unemployed workers and v is the measure of vacancies. The
￿rst input of the matching function is the sum of unemployed workers￿search e⁄orts while
the second input is the measure of vacancies posted by ￿rms. The matching function exhibits
constant returns to scale, is strictly concave and increasing with respect to each of its arguments.









the number of matches cannot be greater than the measure of unemployed workers or the
measure of vacancies).
From the aggregate matching function we are able to derive the matching probabilities for
an unemployed worker and a vacancy. Denote u the measure of unemployed workers, u =
R
U di,
and ￿ s =
R
U sidi=u denotes the average search e⁄ort of an unemployed workers. We de￿ne
market tightness as ￿ = v=￿ su. The job ￿nding probability of an unemployed worker searching




















Finally, ongoing matches are destroyed exogenously with probability ￿ every period. Firms
enter the market as long as they make nonnegative expected pro￿ts.
42.2 Workers and ￿rms
Let Wu denote the expected lifetime utility of an unemployed worker, and We(w) the expected
lifetime utility of an employed worker who is paid a wage w. The Bellman equation for the
value of being unemployed is1
Wu = max
s>0
fb ￿ c(s) + ￿ [sp(￿)We(w) + (1 ￿ sp(￿))Wu]g (1)
According to (1) an unemployed worker enjoys an income b and searches for a job with intensity
s. With probability sp(￿) he ￿nds a job and starts the next period as employed, and with the
complement probability he remains unemployed. The optimal choice of search intensity solves
c0(s) = ￿p(￿)[We(w) ￿ Wu] (2)
Since c0(:) is strictly increasing, c0(0) = 0 and c0(1) = 1, there is a unique solution to (2).
Consequently, all unemployed workers search for a job with the same intensity.
The Bellman equation for the value of being employed is
We(w) = w + ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)We(w) + ￿Wu] (3)
An employed worker gets w and remains employed next period with exogenous probability
(1 ￿ ￿). If the match dissolves with probability ￿, she becomes unemployed next period.
Next we turn to ￿rms. Let Ju be the value of a vacant job and Je(w) the value of a ￿lled
job when the wage paid to the worker is w. The Bellman equation for the value of a vacancy is
Ju = ￿￿ + ￿ [q(￿)Je(w) + (1 ￿ q(￿))Ju] (4)
According to (4) a ￿rm posting a vacancy incurs an advertising cost ￿ and the job is ￿lled
with probability q(￿). Firms enter into the market as a long as they make nonnegative pro￿ts.
1We assume that the optimal s is such that sp(￿) 2 [0;1].





According to (5) the value of a ￿lled job must be equal to the expected recruiting cost incurred
by the ￿rm to ￿ll a vacancy.
The Bellman equation for the value of a ￿lled job is
Je(w) = z ￿ w + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)Je(w): (6)
According to (6) a ￿lled job generates a pro￿t z￿w per period, and the job survives destruction
with probability (1 ￿ ￿).
2.3 Equilibrium
There are essentially three endogenous variables in the model: s;u and ￿ (therefore v). Search




1 ￿ ￿ + ￿ [sp(￿) + ￿]
[w ￿ b + c(s)] (7)
Di⁄erentiating (7), it can be checked that
￿






1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿ [sp(￿) + ￿]
[w ￿ b + c(s)]￿p0(￿)
If c000(s) > 0 then ds=d￿ > 0. Workers￿search e⁄ort increases as the market becomes tighter.
To determine the equilibrium market tightness substitute Je(w) by its expression given by





1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(8)
Notice from (8) that ￿ is determined independently of workers￿search intensity.
Finally, the law of motion for unemployment is
6u+1 = u + (1 ￿ u)￿ ￿ sp(￿)u (9)
Hence, unemployment next period, u+1, is equal to the unemployment in the current period
plus the in￿ ow of job destructions, (1 ￿ u)￿, minus job creations, M(
R
U sidi;v). At the steady





Having described the equilibrium conditions, we can formally state the de￿nition of the
equilibrium.
De￿nition 1 A steady state equilibrium with exogenous wage is a triple (s; ￿;u) that satis￿es
(7), (8) and (10).
Equilibrium has a simple recursive structure. Equation (8) determines ￿. Knowing ￿; (7)
gives s. Finally, given ￿ and s, (10) gives u.
The following Proposition describes the e⁄ects of a change in the wage on the equilibrium
outcome.
Proposition 2 (i) Market tightness decreases with w. (ii) Search e⁄ort is a non-monotonic
function of w. If w 2 fb;zg then s = 0. (iii) Equilibrium unemployment is a non-monotonic
function of the wage. If w 2 fb;zg then u = 1.
Proof. (i) Direct from (8). (ii) Since c(0) = c0(0) = 0; it is easy to check that s = 0 solves (7)
when w = b. If w = z then ￿ = 0 from (8) which implies s = 0 from (7). (iii) If s = 0 then
u = 1 from (10).
Intuitively, if worker gets all the surplus than ￿rms have no incentives to post vacancies,
knowing that there are no vacancies, workers will not search at all. Similarly, if workers￿outside
option is no better than their income while unemployed, they do not search for a job. In both
cases unemployment will be maximum.
72.4 Endogeneizing the wage
A standard assumption in the literature is to assume that wages are determined according to
the generalized Nash bargaining solution where the worker￿ s bargaining power is ￿ 2 (0;1).
The negotiated wage solves
w = argmax[We(w) ￿ Wu]
￿ [Je(w)]
1￿￿ (11)
From (3) and (6) this can be reformulated as










Multiplying both sides of (12) by 1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) and using (3) and (6),
w = ￿z + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)Wu (14)
So the wage is a weighted-mean of the worker￿ s productivity (z) and his permanent income
when unemployed ((1 ￿ ￿)Wu). From (1), (5) and (12) (1 ￿ ￿)Wu satis￿es




Thus, the expression for the wage is
w = ￿z + (1 ￿ ￿)[b ￿ c(s)] + s￿￿￿ (16)




z ￿ b + c(s) ￿ sc0(s)
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(17)
8Notice that the right-hand side of (17) is increasing in s. Therefore, (17) gives a negative
relationship between ￿ and s.
In the presence of minimum wage, the equation for wage becomes
w = maxf￿z + (1 ￿ ￿)[b ￿ c(s)] + s￿￿￿;wg (18)
De￿nition 3 A steady state equilibrium with endogenous wage formation is a list (￿;s;w;u)
that solves (10), (13), (18) and (17).
The pair (￿;s) is uniquely determined by (13) and (17). Then, given (￿;s), w is determined
by (16) and u is given by (10).
2.5 Welfare
We now ask whether the decentralized equilibrium is optimal. To this end, we consider the
problem of a social planner who is subject to the matching frictions captured by M(￿ su;v) and
who maximizes the sum of all agents utility. For simplicity, suppose that the planner is in￿nitely
patient (￿ ! 1) and only cares about the steady state welfare. His problem is
max
u;s;v;￿




where we have used that v = ￿su.
Proposition 4 Equilibrium is e¢ cient i⁄worker￿ s bargaining power, ￿; is equal to the elasticity
of matching function with respect to unemployment, ￿(￿). Equivalently, the expression for the
e¢ cient wage is
w = ￿(￿)z + [1 ￿ ￿(￿)][b ￿ c(s)] + s￿(￿)￿￿ (20)




sp(￿)z + ￿ [b ￿ c(s)] ￿ ￿s￿￿
￿ + sp(￿)
￿
9The ￿rst-order conditions with respect to s and ￿ are
s : p(￿)z ￿ ￿c0(s) ￿ ￿￿￿ = p(￿)
sp(￿)z + ￿ [b ￿ c(s)] ￿ ￿s￿￿
￿ + sp(￿)
(21)
￿ : sp0(￿)z ￿ s￿￿ = sp0(￿)
sp(￿)z + ￿ [b ￿ c(s)] ￿ ￿s￿￿
￿ + sp(￿)
(22)
Divide (21) by (22) and use the fact that ￿(￿) ￿
￿q0(￿)￿







Then, rearrange (21) by using the fact that p(￿) = ￿q(￿) in order to get
￿￿
[1 ￿ ￿(￿)]q(￿)
= z ￿ b + c(s) ￿ sc0(s) (24)







= z ￿ b + c(s) ￿ sc0(s) (26)
The comparison of (23)-(24) and (25)-(26) shows that equilibrium is e¢ cient i⁄ ￿ = ￿(￿).
Substituting ￿ = ￿(￿) into (16) the expression for the wage is given by (20).
Proposition 4 states that equilibrium is e¢ cient when the worker￿ s bargaining power (￿)
coincides with the elasticity of the matching function (￿). This is the so-called Hosios (1990)
condition for e¢ ciency in environments with search frictions. The interpretation for this con-
dition is as follows. Since the matching function exhibits constant returns to scale, it satis￿es
M(su;v) = Musu + Mvv;
where Mu and Mv are the partial derivatives of M with respect to each of its arguments. The




10According to Mortensen (1982), e¢ ciency requires that workers get the entire surplus of the
match in those matches that they are responsible for, that is, a fraction ￿ of the matches.
Equivalently, since workers are risk neutral, they should receive a fraction ￿ of all match sur-
pluses, that is ￿ = ￿. Of course, there are no reasons that ￿ and ￿ coincide and therefore the
equilibrium is in general ine¢ cient.
Proposition 5 Worker￿ s search intensity is increasing with worker￿ s bargaining power when-
ever ￿(￿) > ￿ and it reaches its maximum when ￿(￿) = ￿.






= sign[￿(￿) ￿ ￿]
According to Proposition 5, an increase in the bargaining power of workers raises their
search intensity if the elasticity of the matching function is less than their bargaining power.
In other words, if the wage is too low ￿ lower than the level that maximizes social welfare￿then
a mandatory increase in the wage can raise the search e⁄ort of workers and society￿ s welfare
together.
2.6 Calibration and numerical exercise
We calibrate our model to match some simple features of U.S. labor markets2. We present two
di⁄erent calibrations here; one for exogenously given wage and one for the endogenous wage
determined through Nash bargaining, as usual in the literature. We assume a Cobb-Douglas
functional form for the matching function: M = (￿ su)￿v1￿￿; implying that p(￿) = ￿1￿￿ and




￿(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))
￿1=￿
(27)
A model period is normalized to be a month, implying ￿ = 0:9967 to match about 4%
2Our calibration targets aggregate labor market outcomes. A more relevant calibration might target a
speci￿c group such as low-skilled young workers.
11interest rate. We normalize the match output to be 1. Given this, value of leisure is calibrated
to b = 0:4 following Shimer (2005a). The parameter of the matching function, ￿; comes from
Merz (1995). Shimer (2005b) computes average monthly separation probabilities for a worker
in the U.S. to be around 4%. This pins down ￿.
We also need a speci￿c functional form, and an estimate for the cost function c(s): We follow




They estimate ￿ to be 1:18 using Danish labor market data. We then calibrate c0 such
that the steady state unemployment rate is 0:056, which is the long-run average in the U.S.
Finally, we calibrate wage to be the midpoint of the feasible set and ￿ to match average vacancy
duration of 1.5 months.
Table 1: Benchmark Calibration with Search E⁄ort
Parameter Exogenous Wage Nash Bargaining Source
￿ 0:9967 0:9967 4% interest rate
￿ 0:4 0:4 Merz (1995)
￿ 0:0339 0:0339 Shimer (2005b)
z 1 1 Normalization
b 0:4 0:4 Shimer (2005a)
w 0:7 n:a: (z ￿ b)=2
￿ 8:0621 1:7144 Match q(￿) = 0:67
￿ 1:18 1:18 Christensen et.al (2005)
c0 1:645 8:4082 Match u = 0:056
w n:a: 0:7 (z ￿ b)=2
￿ n:a: 0:4 Hosios (1990)
Given this benchmark calibration, we want to understand how the wage a⁄ects equilibrium
unemployment and search e⁄ort. Therefore the numerical exercise involves solving the equilib-
rium for di⁄erent wages in the feasible set [b;z]; given all other parameters in Table 1. Figure
2 plots equilibrium unemployment, search e⁄ort and welfare for di⁄erent w: The level of wage
12that minimizes unemployment rate does not necessarily coincide with the wage that maximizes
social welfare as de￿ned by equation (19). In our numerical example, for instance, society will
be better o⁄ by increasing the wage above the level that minimizes unemployment rate. The
non-monotonic nature of search e⁄ort is also evident in Figure 2.
































Figure 2: Unemployment, Search E⁄ort and Welfare for Di⁄erent Wages
The calibration when the wage is endogeneously determined by Nash bargaining is only
di⁄erent with respect to four parameters: w, ￿, ￿ and c0. We set w = 0:7, which guarantees
that in the benchmark equilibrium, minimum wage is not binding. The worker￿ s bargaining
power, ￿, is assumed to satisfy the Hosios condition i.e., ￿ = ￿, for the benchmark equilibrium
(Hosios, 1990). The remaining two parameters, ￿ and c0 are calibrated with the same targets
in mind; expected vacancy duration and unemployment rate, respectively. Implied values are,
￿ = 1:7144 and c0 = 8:4082.
We compute steady state equilibrium for di⁄erent values of the bargaining power parameter,
13￿. The e⁄ects of changing the bargaining parameter is presented in Figure 3, which numerically
con￿rms propositions (4) and (5). Steady state welfare is maximized when the Hosios condition
is satis￿ed, which happens when ￿ = ￿ = 0:4. This situation also leads to the highest
search e⁄ort exerted by workers in this economy. The level of bargaining power that minimizes
unemployment is lower than the level of bargaining power that maximizes welfare.
































Figure 3: Unemployment, Search E⁄ort and Welfare for Di⁄erent Bargaining Power
3 Participation in the labor force
Up to now we have ignored workers￿decisions to participate in the labor force in order to
focus on their search behavior when unemployed. To start with, suppose that the population
is normalized to 1. We introduce a participation decision by assuming that a worker out of
the labor force gets some utility ￿ ow ￿. This utility stems from non-market activities such
14as raising children, doing some cooking and cleaning, and enjoying leisure. We assume that
workers di⁄er in terms of their utility at home. The distribution of utilities is G(￿), where
G0(￿) > 0. For simplicity, assume that unemployed workers no longer need to search (s = 1,
and c(1) = 0): Equations describing expected utilities for workers and ￿rms remain the same
with this last quali￿cation.
The expected lifetime utility of a worker out of the labor force is Wo(￿) that satis￿es
Wo(￿) = ￿
1￿￿. A worker will choose to participate in the labor force if Wo(￿) < Wu, or
equivalently if ￿ < ￿u where
￿u = (1 ￿ ￿)Wu. (28)
If the wage is exogenous, then this expression can be simpli￿ed further by making use of
(1) and (3), i.e,
￿u =
b(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)) + w￿p(￿)
f1 ￿ ￿ [1 ￿ p(￿) ￿ ￿]g
(29)
The wage is set in accordance with the generalized Nash solution then, from (15),




The equilibrium participation rate is L = G(￿u).
The equation of motion for unemployment changes slightly to accommodate for variations
in the labor force, i.e.,
U+1 = U + (L ￿ U)￿ ￿ p(￿)U (31)










An equilibrium is then de￿ned as follows.
15De￿nition 6 A steady state equilibrium with endogenous participation and exogenous wage
is a 3-tuple (￿u; ￿;u) that satis￿es (8), (29), and (32).
We consider next the e⁄ects of an increase in wage on participation, market tightness and
unemployment rate.
Proposition 7 A higher wage reduces market tightness and it increases unemployment rate.
It increases the participation in the labor force provided that w < ^ w; where ^ w satis￿es (20).
The proof is similar to the ones in previous section and therefore omitted. See also proof of
Proposition 9.
De￿nition 8 A steady state equilibrium with endogenous participation and endogenous wage
determination is a 4-tuple (￿u;w; ￿;u) that satis￿es (8), (18), (30) and (32).
We have a similar proposition about the e⁄ects of an increase in the binding minimum wage
on participation, market tightness and unemployment rate.
Proposition 9 A binding minimum wage reduces market tightness and raises unemployment
rate. It can raise participation in the labor force provided that ￿ < ￿(￿).
Proof. From (8) and (28) it is easy to check that an increase in w reduces ￿ and increases u
(provided it is binding). Since we know that an increase in ￿ generates an increase in w, we
focus in the following on the e⁄ect of raising workers￿bargaining power. Total di⁄erential (17)

















163.1 Calibration and numerical exercise







We calibrate ￿ to match the labor force participation rate of 66 percent in the U.S. The cost
of posting a vacancy, ￿ is calibrated to match the long -run average unemployment rate, which
implies ￿ = 35:164. We assume a standard Cobb-Douglas matching function, M = u￿v1￿￿,
and calibrate ￿ to be 0:72 following Shimer (2005a). The remaining parameters, ￿, ￿, z, b and
w follow the same calibration strategy employed in section 2.6. When we extend the model
to incorporate endogenous wage determination through Nash bargaining, we set ￿ = ￿ due to
Hosios (1990). In addition, ￿ and ￿ also changes to match unemployment rate and participation
rate targets respectively. This calibration is summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Benchmark Calibration with Labor Force Participation
Parameter Exogenous Wage Nash Bargaining Source
￿ 0:9967 0:9967 4% interest rate
￿ 0:72 0:72 Shimer (2005a)
￿ 0:0339 0:0339 Shimer (2005b)
z 1 1 Normalization
b 0:4 0:4 Shimer (2005a)
w 0:7 n:a: (z ￿ b)=2
￿ 35:164 1:65 Match u = 0:056
￿ 0:6315 0:88 Match G(￿u) = 0:67
w n:a: 0:7 (z ￿ b)=2
￿ n:a: 0:72 Hosios (1990)
Our numerical exercise is to evaluate how endogenous variables like unemployment rate,
participation rate and welfare, change in response to changes in the level of the minimum wage.
We undertake the same exercise for both the model with exogenous wage and the model with
endogenous wage determined through Nash bargaining.





























Figure 4: Welfare, Participation and Unemployment Rate for Di⁄erent Wages



















































Figure 5: Welfare and LFPR for Di⁄erent Bargaining Powers
19Figures 4 and 5 con￿rm Propositions (7) and (9). Social welfare can increase as long as
wage (or the bargaining power) is lower than the e¢ cient level. The participation rate closely
follows social welfare qualitatively, peaking when welfare is maximized.
4 Working time
In this section we endogenize the number of working hours and we study the e⁄ects of a
minimum-wage regulation on employment and unemployment. Suppose that the match output
is a function z(h) of the number of working hours spent by the employee. It satis￿es z(0) = 0,
z0(h) > 0 and z00(h) < 0. The disutility of work is e(h) with e(0) = 0, e0(h) > 0 and e00(h) > 0.
To simplify the presentation, we will assume in this section that b = 0.
The Bellman equation for the value of an employed worker is
We(w;h) = wh ￿ e(h) + ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)We(w;h) + ￿Wu]; (34)
where w is the hourly wage. Similarly, the value of a ￿lled job satis￿es
Je(w;h) = z(h) ￿ wh + ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)Je(w;h) + ￿Ju] (35)





1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(36)
Since we have seen that a minimum wage could be welfare enhancing when employers have a
su¢ ciently high bargaining power, we assume in the following that wages and working time are
set unilaterally by ￿rms. Thus, the ￿rm will choose (w;h) so as to maximize Je(w;h) subject to
the participation constraint of the worker, We(w;h) ￿ Wu, and the minimum wage constraint,
20w ￿ w. From (34) and (35) this problem can be simpli￿ed to
max
w;h
[z(h) ￿ wh] (37)
s.t. wh ￿ e(h) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Wu (38)
w ￿ w (39)
It is easy to check from (37)-(39) that if the minimum wage constraint is not binding the
laissez-faire equilibrium is such that





According to (40) the number of hours is set so as to maximize the match surplus. According
to (41) the wage is chosen to allow the ￿rm to extract the entire surplus of the match. From




< e0(h) = z0(h)
So the hourly wage is less than the marginal product of an hour.
We de￿ne a laissez-faire equilibrium as follows.
De￿nition 10 A laissez-faire equilibrium with endogenous working time is a list (w;h;￿;u)
that satis￿es (10), (36), (40) and (41).
Following the same reasoning as before, one can establish that there is a unique equilibrium
and it is ine¢ cient. Since ￿rms have all the bargaining power, market tightness is too high and
unemployment is too low.
Consider next the case where w ￿ w￿ ￿ e(h￿)]=h￿ where h￿ denotes the solution to (40).
There are two regimes to consider. The ￿rst regime is such that the worker￿ s participation
constraint (38) is binding. Then, h satis￿es
wh = e(h) (42)
21It is optimal for the ￿rm to choose h that satis￿es (42) if and only if z0(h) > w. In this case,
the ￿rm has no incentive to cut hours to increase its pro￿ts. Also, (42) holds then w < e0(h) so
that the ￿rm cannot raise hours without violating the worker￿ s participation constraint. The
condition z0(h) > w implies h < ~ h where ~ h > h￿ is the unique solution to z0(h) = e(h)=h and
w ￿ ~ w ￿ e(~ h)=~ h.
The second regime is such that the worker￿ s participation constraint (38) does not bind. In
this case,
z0(h) = w (43)
The worker￿ s participation constraint does not bind if wh￿e(h) > 0 which requires h ￿ ~ h and
w ￿ ~ w.
De￿nition 11 An equilibrium with binding minimum wage and endogenous working time is
a list (h;￿;u) that satis￿es (10), (36), (42) if w ￿ ~ w and (43) otherwise.
The e⁄ects of an increase in the minimum wage are as follows.
Proposition 12 An increase in the minimum wage reduces market tightness and increases
unemployment. If w ￿ ~ w the number of working hours increases while if w > ~ w the number of
working hours decreases.
Proof. From (37)-(39) an increase in w reduces z(h)￿wh. We deduce from (10) and (36) that
￿ falls and u increases. From (42) h increases with w. From (43) h decreases with w.
We can also make a statement about the welfare e⁄ects of a limited increase in the minimum
wage.
Proposition 13 A binding minimum wage in [w￿; ~ w] is Pareto-worsening.
Proof. If w 2 [w￿; ~ w] then (38) is binding and Wu = We = 0. Since ￿ decreases with w,
Je = ￿=￿q(￿) is lower and ￿rms are worse-o⁄.
4.1 Calibration and numerical exercise
In this section, our calibration requires functional forms for match output and disutility of work.
We assume that match output takes the simple form, z(h) = ￿h1=2 with ￿ > 0. The disutility
22of work is e(h) = ah2 where a > 0.
In our calibration we target unemployment rate as well as average monthly hours of work in
the U.S. The average hours of work is approximately 33 in a week in the U.S., which implies a
target of 143 for our monthly model. Given these targets in mind, ￿ is calibrated to normalize
monthly output to 10. Then, from (40), a is required to be 0:0001 to match target hours of
work in the model. For simpli￿cation, we set b and ￿ to zero. Finally, we set the value of
the minimum wage arbitrarily low such that it is not binding in the benchmark calibration.
Calibration for this section is summarized in Table 3.
Table 3: Benchmark Calibration with Hours of Work
Parameter Value Source
￿ 0:9967 4% interest rate
￿ 0:72 Shimer (2005a)
￿ 0:0339 Shimer (2005b)
￿ 0:8362 Normalize z(h￿) = 10
b 0 Assumption
￿ 879 Match u = 0:056
a 0:0001 Match h￿ = 143
w 0:012 Benchmark, not binding
￿ 0 Assumption
We have shown in Proposition 12 that increasing the level of the minimum wage unambigu-
ously reduces equilibrium market tightness, thereby decreasing the job ￿nding probability and
raising the unemployment rate. We con￿rm this point numerically in Figure 6. In our bench-
mark, equilibrium hourly wage in the absence of minimum wage, w￿; implied by (41) is 0:0175.
As the hourly minimum wage level increases beyond w￿, minimum wage becomes binding and
a⁄ects the unemployment rate and market tightness in the predicted way. However, the implied
increase in unemployment could be quantitatively small. For this stylized model, if minimum
wage is raised by 40 percent from an initial level that is not binding, say 0:0175, unemployment
rate could increase by a mere 2:8 percent, form 5:67 percent to 5:83 percent.
One interpretation for the small e⁄ect of a minimum wage increase on unemployment is














































Figure 6: Unemployment and Market Tightness for Di⁄erent Minimum Wage Levels































Figure 7: Hours and Welfare for Di⁄erent Minimum Wage Levels
25that ￿rms can easily adjust labor at the intensive margin by increasing hours initially. This
is possible in this example, because ￿rms have all the bargaining power (￿ = 0). Therefore,
as long as workers are willing to work, ￿rms can partially undo the e⁄ects of a minimum wage
increase by raising hours. Following the same example of a 40 percent raise in the minimum
wage, hours increase by almost 40 percent from 143 to 200. However, as ￿gure 7 shows, such
a raise reduces welfare. This result directly follows from Proposition 13. Finally, note that
the decline in welfare and the increase in hours are both sustained as long as (38) is binding.
However, after the in￿ ection point in ￿gure 7 a higher minimum wage increases can be welfare
improving.
5 Job destruction
Up to now, we have assumed that the productivity z of a job is constant and jobs are destroyed
according to some exogenous probability ￿. In order to endogenize the decision by ￿rms to
destroy jobs we follow Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and assume that the productivity of a
match changes over time.
The productivity is assumed to be the product of two components: z; which is an aggregate
component common to all jobs, and x 2 [0;1] which is speci￿c to the ￿rm. Introducing a speci￿c
component for the productivity of ￿rms captures the heterogeneity among jobs.
The idiosyncratic component x takes a new value each time the match receives a signal with
probability ￿. Consider a ￿rm with current productivity xz which receives a signal ~ x where ~ x
is a random draw from H(x). Then, the new productivity of the match is x0z where
x0 = min(x; ~ x)
This assumption guarantees that the productivity of the match declines over time.
A newly-created job starts with the highest productivity, i.e., x = 1. After some random
period of time, the ￿rm is subject to an idiosyncratic shock, and the productivity of the match
starts decreasing. When the productivity reaches a low value, the ￿rm ￿nds worthwhile to
destroy the job.
26One can interpret the production technology as "putty-clay". The production units embody
the most advanced techniques available at the time of their creation. However, a ￿rm cannot
change its technology and adopt the leading one once production has started. There is complete
irreversibility of initial choices.
5.1 Workers, ￿rms and the match surplus
The lifetime expected utility of an employed worker in a match with productivity zx satis￿es










+ [1 ￿ ￿H(x)]We(x)g; (44)
where ￿(x) is an indicator function equal to one if the match is maintained and 0 is the match
is destroyed (either unilaterally by the worker or the ￿rm or, by mutual agreement). Similarly,
the value of a ￿lled job satis￿es





Je(x0)￿(x0)dH(x0) + [1 ￿ ￿H(x)]Je(x)
￿
(45)
De￿ne the total surplus of a match with productivity zx as S(x) ￿ We(x)+Je(x)￿Wu. From
(44) and (45) the value of a match satis￿es the following Bellman equation





S(x0)￿(x0)dH(x0) + [1 ￿ ￿H(x)]S(x)
￿
(46)
According to (46) a match generates output xz minus the opportunity cost for the worker
of being employed, (1 ￿ ￿)Wu. With probability ￿ an idiosyncratic shock occurs; the new
productivity is lower than the current one with probability H(x); the ￿rm and the worker can
then decide to maintain the match or destroy it.
The decision to maintain a match is given by
￿(x) = 1 () min[We(x) ￿ Wu;Je(x)] ￿ 0:
In the absence of a minimum wage, and provided that the worker and the ￿rm can renegotiate
27the wage when an idiosyncratic productivity shock occurs, We(x) ￿ Wu = ￿S(x) and Je(x) =
(1 ￿ ￿)S(x). Therefore, the match is maintained as long as S(x) ￿ 0. In the presence of a
minimum wage, We(x) ￿ Wu ￿ ￿S(x) and Je(x) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)S(x). Therefore, the match is
maintained as long as Je(x) ￿ 0 (which does not necessarily coincide with S(x) ￿ 0). Using
a guess-and-verify method, we assume that both S(x) and Je(x) are increasing functions of x
and verify later that this conjecture is correct. As a consequence, there is a threshold xR for x
below which a match is destroyed. It satis￿es Je(xR) = 0 (as well as S(xR) = 0 in the absence
of a minimum wage.)
Using integration by parts, (46) can be rearranged as
(1 ￿ ￿)S(x) = xz ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Wu ￿ ￿￿
Z x
xR
S0(x0)H(x0)dx0 ￿ ￿￿H(xR)S(xR) (47)
The ￿rst term on the right-hand side of (47) is the ￿ ow surplus of a match and the last two terms
are the capital losses when a new productivity is drawn. We can solve for S(x) closed-form as
follows. First, di⁄erentiate (47) with respect to x to get
S0(x) =
z
1 ￿ ￿ [1 ￿ ￿H(x)]
(48)
Thus, (48) con￿rms our guess that S(0x) > 0. Second, integrate (48) from xR to x to compute
the expression for a match surplus,
S(x) =
xRz ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Wu





1 ￿ ￿ [1 ￿ ￿H(x0)]
dx0; (49)
where the ￿rst term is the expression for S(xR) derived from (47).
Let us turn to unemployed workers and vacancies. The value of an unemployed worker and
a vacant job satisfy
(1 ￿ ￿)Wu = b + ￿p(￿)[We(1) ￿ Wu] (50)
(1 ￿ ￿)Ju = ￿￿ + ￿q(￿)Je(1) (51)
285.2 Job creations and destructions
We assume in the following that the minimum wage constraint is not binding at x = 1. (The case
where it does bind for all x is similar to the model above where w = w and ￿ = H(w=z).) Since
wages are determined according to the generalized Nash solution then We(1) ￿ Wu = ￿S(1)
and Je(1) = (1 ￿ ￿)S(1).
Consider ￿rst job creations. Market tightness is determined by the free-entry condition





According to (52) the ￿rm￿ s surplus at the beginning of the relationship (i.e., when x = 1) must
be equal to the average advertising cost incurred by the ￿rm to ￿nd a worker.
In order to compute the value of the match at the time when it is created, we need to
determine the permanent income of an unemployed worker, (1 ￿ ￿)Wu. Substituting S(1) by
its expression given by (52) into (50) we obtain




According to (53) the value of an unemployed worker increases with ￿. From (49) and (52)
market tightness in equilibrium solves
xRz ￿ b ￿ ￿￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿)










Consider next job destructions. If the minimum wage constraint is not binding then xRz =
(1 ￿ ￿)Wu and the ￿rst term on the left-hand side of (54) vanishes. If the minimum wage
constraint is binding then Je(xR) = 0 which from (45) implies zxR = w. So,








We next establish that there is a threshold ￿ x below which the minimum wage constraint binds.
For the minimum wage to bind, it has to be that We(x)￿Wu ￿ ￿S(x) when w(x) = w. Since
@We(x)=@x = 0 when w(x) = w we deduce that if the minimum wage binds at x = ￿ x then it
binds for all x < ￿ x.
From (44), for all x < ￿ x the surplus of an employed worker satis￿es
We(x) ￿ Wu =
w ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Wu
1 ￿ ￿ [1 ￿ ￿H(xR)]
; 8x < ￿ x (56)
Notice from (56) that the worker￿ s surplus is independent from x. Using the fact that Je(xR) = 0
we deduce that We(x) ￿ Wu = S(xR) for all x < ￿ x. For all x < ￿ x the value of an employed
worker satis￿es











S(xR)dH(x0) ￿ ￿H(x)[We(x) ￿ Wu]
￿
(57)
Using the fact that We(x) ￿ Wu = ￿S(x) for all x > ￿ x we rewrite (57) as follows,











Using (46) and (53) after some calculation we ￿nd the following expression for the wage







So, if the minimum wage constraint is never binding (￿ x < xR) then the expression for the wage
is w(x) = ￿xz+(1￿￿)(1￿￿)Wu. If the minimum wage constraint binds for some productivity
above the reservation productivity then the worker is able to increase his share in the surplus
of the match. However, ￿rms anticipate that the minimum wage constraint will be binding for
low productivity levels and as a consequence they reduce the wage paid at higher productivity
levels. Using integration by parts, and the fact that ￿S(￿ x) = S(xR), the expression for the
30wage can be rewritten as
w(x) = ￿xz +
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿ [1 ￿ ￿H (xR)]
[(1 ￿ ￿)b + ￿￿￿] +
(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿H(xR)






1 ￿ ￿ [1 ￿ ￿H(x0)]
H(x0)dx0 (60)
The threshold ￿ x is determined by the condition We(￿ x)￿Wu = ￿S(￿ x). From (49) and (56),
(1 ￿ ￿)
w ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Wu





1 ￿ ￿ [1 ￿ ￿H(x0)]
dx0 (61)
5.4 Equilibrium
Before we turn to the de￿nition of an equilibrium, we need to characterize the case ￿ x > 1 when
the minimum wage constraint binds for all productivity levels. In this case,
We(x) ￿ Wu =
w ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Wu
1 ￿ ￿ [1 ￿ ￿H(xR)]
(62)
From (50) the permanent income of an unemployed worker satis￿es
(1 ￿ ￿)Wu =
f1 ￿ ￿ [1 ￿ ￿H(xR)]gb + ￿p(￿)w
1 ￿ ￿ [1 ￿ ￿H(xR) ￿ p(￿)]
(63)





1 ￿ ￿ [1 ￿ ￿H(x0)]
dx0 (64)







1 ￿ ￿ [1 ￿ ￿H(x0)]
dx0 (65)
The minimum wage constraint is binding at all productivity levels if (1 ￿ ￿)[We(1) ￿ Wu] >
￿Je(1) which requires
w ￿ b ￿ ￿￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿)







1 ￿ ￿ [1 ￿ ￿H(x0)]
dx0 (66)
31Finally, to complete our description of equilibrium we need to specify the distribution of
workers￿states. The dynamics for unemployment satis￿es ut+1 = ut+￿H(xR)(1￿ut)￿￿q(￿)ut.





Denote G(x) the distribution of employed workers￿productivity. At the steady-state, [1 ￿ G(x)]￿
[H(x) ￿ H(xR)] = G(x)￿H(xR) for all x 2 [xR;1). Therefore,
G(x) = 1 ￿
H(xR)
H(x)
; 8x 2 [xR;1) (68)
The fraction of employed workers at the x = 1 satis￿es
G(1) ￿ G(1￿) = H(xR) (69)
De￿nition 14 A steady-state equilibrium is a list [xR;￿;w(x);u;G(x)] that satis￿es (54), (55),
(60), (67) and (68)-(69).
The model has a simple recursive structure. Equations (54) and (55) can be used to solve
for xR and ￿. Then, (60) gives w(x) and (67) gives u.
Proposition 15 Equilibrium exists and is unique. The minimum wage constraint binds if
￿





1 ￿ ￿ [1 ￿ ￿H(x0)]
dx0 (70)
where ￿ ￿ = (wz ￿ b)(1 ￿ ￿)=￿￿.




[xRz ￿ b ￿ ￿￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿)]







1 ￿ ￿ [1 ￿ ￿H (xR)]
￿￿1
In the space (xR;￿) the curve that represents (54) is hump-shaped and it reaches a maximum
when it intersects xRz = b + ￿￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿). When ￿ = 0 the curve representing (54) is located
32R x
z w
Figure 8: Equilibrium with endogenous job destructions
to the left of the curve representing (55). When xR = 1 the curve representing (54) is located
below the curve representing (55). Thus, (54) and (55) intersect and an equilibrium exists.
To establish uniqueness, recalls that (54) intersects once with xRz = b + ￿￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿) at its
maximum. Using this observation one can show that (54) and (55) intersect once. (ii) Binding
minimum wage. The minimum wage is binding if at xR = w=z the curve representing (54) is
located below the curve representing (55). The value of ￿ given by (55) at xR = w=z is ￿ ￿. The
solution to (54) at xR = w=z is smaller than ￿ ￿ if
xRz ￿ b ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿=(1 ￿ ￿)





1 ￿ ￿ [1 ￿ ￿H(x0)]
dx0 <
￿
￿q(￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
Notice that the ￿rst term on the left-hand side of the previous expression is 0 to get (70).
Next we turn to the e⁄ects of raising the minimum wage on the equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 16 Assume (70) holds. An increase in the minimum wage reduces ￿ and raises
xR and u.
Proof. When (70) holds the minimum wage constraint binds and the curve representing (55)
intersects the curve representing (54) in its downward-sloping part. An increase in w moves the
33curve representing (55) to the right in the space (xR;￿). Thus, xR increases and ￿ falls. From
(67) we deduce that u increases.
According to Proposition 16, an increase in the minimum wage reduces job creations, raises
job destructions and increases unemployment.
5.5 Calibration and numerical exercise
We follow a simple benchmark calibration that targets the average unemployment rate and job
destruction in the model to match the U.S. counterparts. For simplicity, we will be silent about
the implications of H(x) on the cross sectional distribution of employment as it relates to wage
and tenure distribution. Such a calibration would be beyond the scope of this paper.
First, we assume that H(x) is normally distributed with mean ￿ and standard deviation ￿,
appropriately reweighted such that x 2 [0;1]. Since we assume that all matches start with the
highest productivity, we choose a right skewed distribution by setting ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 0:5.
A Cobb-Douglas matching function does not necessarily imply well-de￿ned probabilities for








We calibrate ￿ to to be 0:4; closely following Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006).
3To see this point, consider the job ￿nding probability under Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation, p(￿) = ￿
1￿￿.
For ￿ > 0, p(￿) is well-de￿ned if it is restricted to be less than 1. Hence, p(￿) = minf1;￿
1￿￿g. Enforcing
this restriction throughout the computation of the equilibrium with endogenous job destruction could be very
di¢ cult. Matching function in equation 71 does not require such a restriction.
34Table 4: Calibration with Endogenous Destruction
Parameter Value Source
￿ 0:9967 4% interest rate
￿ 0:4 Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006)
￿ 0:4 Hosios (1990)
￿ 0:05 Match ￿H(xR)
b 0:4 Assumption
￿ 1 Highest productivity
￿ 0:5 Arbitrary
￿ 0:005 Match u = 0:056
z 1 Normalization
w 0 No minimum wage
The value of posting a vacancy is once again calibrated to match average U.S. unemployment
rate in the post-war period, implying a parameter value of 0:005. The probability of receiving
a new productivity signal, ￿, is an important determinant of the equilibrium separation prob-
ability in the model. We calibrate this parameter to 0:05 to approximately match the average
separation probability reported in Shimer (2005b), 0:0339. In the benchmark equilibrium, we
do not want to have a binding minimum wage, hence w = 0. Remaining parameters follow the
same calibration as in the previous sections and summarized in Table 4.
We investigate numerically how endogenous variables respond to variations in the minimum
wage. To this end, we increase minimum wage from 0:8 to 1:The ￿ndings are, not surprisingly,
in accord with Proposition 16. Figures 9 and 10 show that as the minimum wage increases,
unemployment increases and market tightness declines, whereas xR increases.
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed the e⁄ects of a minimum wage in di⁄erent versions of a search model of
the labor market. We showed that a minimum wage can increase social welfare, labor force
participation and search e⁄ort of workers. We also argue that if ￿rms have other instruments
than the wage to maximize pro￿ts, they can mitigate the negative e⁄ects of the minimum wage.
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Figure 9: Market Tightness and Unemployment Rate for Di⁄erent Minimum Wages
The e⁄ects of a minimum wage could change depend on the structure of the labor market.
In particular, the bargaining power of workers is a crucial determinant. In practice, it is
di¢ cult to assess ￿rms￿bargaining power in the labor market, or the extent of search frictions.
A 2006 study by Christopher Flinn, which estimates workers￿bargaining power, ￿nds that the
market wage exceeds the maximum e⁄ort wage. In this case, increasing the minimum wage
would have negative consequences for both employment and social welfare. Hence, the question
could ultimately be an empirical one.
Many empirical studies have sought to quantify the employment e⁄ects of a minimum wage.
According to Neumark and Washer￿ s (2006) survey of this literature, ￿the preponderance of
the evidence points to disemployment e⁄ects.￿Furthermore, ￿when researchers focus on the
least-skilled groups most likely to be adversely a⁄ected by minimum wages, the evidence for
disemployment e⁄ects seems especially strong.￿
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Figure 10: Reservation Threshold and Unemployment Rate for Di⁄erent Minimum Wages
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